UEFI Privilege Escalation: Execute code in Secure mode
Replace the Secure Monitor to execute user-defined code in Secure mode by using a Secure Monitor Call (SMC)
Using the Yahallo exploit we can get access to Trustzone memory. In the Trustzone you can find all of the firmware's functionality, where some code executes in Secure mode. On top of that, some of the memory is marked as secure, so you can execute it from Secure mode.
The goal is to get rid of Trustzone memory, so the page tables of the Trustzone memory need to be modified. To do this you need to be in the Secure mode.
But how do you get into Secure mode?
UEFI firmware provides runtime services to the running operating system. The communication happens with ACPI or other protocols. But also with interrupts, specifically the Secure Monitor Call (SMC). A user can trigger a SMC by executing the
smc instruction. See the SMC Calling Convention for more information on how such a call happens.When executing a SMC, the processor receives the interrupt and looks in the Monitor Vector Table at the Monitor Vector Base (specified in the Monitor Vector Base Address Register (MVBAR)) for the address of the Secure Monitor and jumps to it. The Secure Monitor is then responsible for reading the variables from the SMC and running the desired function in Secure mode*. Essentially SMCs are used for communicating with the Secure world and the Trustzone kernel.
When you further think about it, you may notice that we could simply replace the Secure Monitor and put our own code there, by using the Yahallo exploit.
* The Secure Monitor executes in Monitor mode. Monitor mode ignores the SCR.NS bit and always executes in secure mode. You can use this to modify configurations which are specific to each execution state.
To replace the Secure Monitor, you first need to locate it. The Monitor Vector Base Address Register points to the Monitor Vector Table, where the third table entry points to the Secure Monitor
Typical structure of a Monitor Vector Table. Additional Resource #1
So just read the MVBAR, right?
Usage restriction of the MVBAR. Additional Resource #2
ARM operating modes/states. Additional Resource #3
So they are only accessible from Secure state. A normal UEFI App executes at PL1 in non-Secure mode.
So reading the register at runtime won't work. But there are other options to get the address.
You can get your UEFI firmware binary from
C:\Windows\Firmware\SurfaceRTUEFI.bin.For reverse engineering we have used Ghidra. For importing make sure to use
ARM:LE:32:V7:default as language.
Ghidra language setting
mcr p15,0x0,r0,cr12,cr0,0x1 is the instruction which sets MVBAR. Search for it. You should only find one result. The disassembly looks something like this:
This is the function that sets MVBAR in the SurfaceRTUEFI.bin binary
When further analyzing this, you will quickly notice that you will not be able to find out MVBAR by just analyzing the UEFI binary. Maybe it's possible, but only with heavy reverse-engineering.
As you might have thought, there is an easier way to get the value of MVBAR.
To analyze a memory dump you need to create one first. Our github repository also compiles into a memory dump tool, modify MemoryDumpTool/App.c if you need to change the memory address.
Import the dump to Ghidra. Use the setting from above, but make sure to go to options and set the Base Address to
80000000. This is where the memory dump started from. After this change continue the import as usual.But what now? You have Megabytes of memory, and you need to pick an exact point out of it.
Of course we read the handful of existing and useful blog posts that are on the internet. Including this one: https://fredericb.info/2014/12/analysis-of-nexus-5-monitor-mode.html
It shows how a Monitor Vector Table looks like, when disassembled:
Monitor Vector Table disassembled
So only search for some branch instructions, right?
Not really. There are a lot of jump tables in the memory dump. After hours upon hours of starring at Ghidra and the internet, I managed to find the right one.
I searched for multiple branch instructions next to each other using this command
xxd "trustzone.bin" | grep -E '(.{3}00 00ea){4}' (CTS helped me with that command)I just went through the results and found a jump table at
0x811f8000.At that point I already had an EFI app which loads a payload into memory, copies it to a desired location in the Trustzone and then fills some memory with an instruction to load the payload location into a register and an instruction to branch to this register. The payload was capable of printing something to UART. I have also tried other jump tables at that time, with no success.
But this time it was different: The payload started executing.
So it was clear: MVBAR is
0x811f8000Right now the payload is placed at
0x8011219c. When analyzing a memory dump you will notice that this is right after an instruction is executed which sets SCR.NS. In theory you will not need to place the payload exactly there. You could also place it before the SCR.NS set, you will always execute in secure mode, as described above. In theory you could also just replace a single Secure Monitor "Function" (When you pass paramteres to a SMC you specify what to do in the Secure Monitor).TODO: Add picture of Ghidra with the memory location
You can find a fully working payload example on GitHub. It includes the Makefile, a linker script, an assembly file and a C source file.
Our payload is position independet, this means it can execute from anywhere in memory. It's really easy to make GCC compile position independet: Just add
-fpic to the CFlags. (Yes, the payload is written in C, other languages such as C++ or Rust may be useable too).When configuring a large amout of registers, using a seperate .S/.asm file is more convinient than using inline assembly.
But there is something worth knowing: You need to make sure that your assembly is relocatable, otherwise the code will break. In C the compiler makes the code reloactable, but the assembler can't make the assembly relocateable for you.
Here is a short example of an assembly file which loads the address of
mybuffer into r0:# This should link into the .text section
.text
# Define a buffer with the size of 16 bytes
mybuffer: .word 16
# Make assembly_code available globally (so it can be used in C code)
.global assembly_code
.type assembly_code, function
assembly_code:
# Push the return address to the stack
# Do this if you branch
push {lr}
# Load the address of mybuffer into memory
# This is the important line.
# ldr r0, =mybuffer doesn't work
adr r0, mybuffer
# Get the return address back from the stack
pop {pc}
What to explain:
- How the payload works and how it is executed and why exactly the strange memory location
- verifying that payload executes in Secure mode
- explain monitor mode a bit more (maybe)
- what to do now
- maybe how to use ghidra
- 1.
- 3.
Last modified 1yr ago